According to Alex de Waal despite the existence of such conflict some form of economic activity in the form of trading between hostile groups does take place (Alex de Waal, 1990). According to Benet, market structures do exist in noncentralized segmentary societies where blood feud and   intergroup conflict are prevalent. These markets maintained by intergroup truces are referred to as explosive markets (Benet 1957).  Thus a paradoxical situation arises of the neutral jurisdiction of the market existing amidst the complexity of intergroup conflict. An analysis of these population processes and social structures should help in explaining the paradoxical events that occur during emergencies when food is used a weapon of war, markets become targets of intergroup conflict, and the acquisition of territory belonging to others occurs. 

 It is assumed the migrant will have more will power to survive than native, because of the environmental distribencies at the origin.

Background:

Oded Stark and David Bloom(1985) have shown how  forced migration due to environmental distribunces can be analyzed as a supergame where migrants act cooperatively in replicating each other actions.  This enables them to become more successful economically in their place of destination than the natives who behave non-cooperatively.  

According to them this process of coordination of actions in an economy, undertaken by migrant networks, is the accumulation of kinship capital.  Kinship in this framework is not based on blood ties but, on a shared perception of efficient ways of cooperation among agents in an economay in resources allocation, in giving credit and so on.  

 According to Robert Bates, Kinship is a social construct that is used to organise capital accumulation in high risk environments (Bates 1989).  His central thesis is that development patterns, including state building, should be understood in terms of the structure of kinship prevelent in a tribal society where kinship is a reflection of attempts to form capital and cope with the risk environment determined by the ecology in which a society is situated.

 This line of  inquiry regarding kinship capital initiated by Oded Stark, David Bloom and Robert Bates will be extended to the analysis of forced migration and the existence of explosive markets.

Arguments:

 The theory of focal points proposed by Schelling and developed by Bacharach and Sugden can be used to analyse the epistemic rationality (Bichhieri, 1993). That is an intrinsic part of group identity in these societies.  The concept of focal points has been proposed by Thomas Schelling as a solution to the problem of coordination in bargaining and has been further developed bt Bacharach and Sugden (Schelling, 1963, Bacharach 1987, Sugden 1995).  A focal point is defined as the point of coordination of behaviour between individuals who have a shared perception of prominent ways of coordinating their actions.  This will explain why these conflicts are not amenable to arbitration.

 Intergroup conflict in high risk environments in the aftermath of a natural disaster (wars, famine, floods,drought, political instability, economic dipression etc.) can be regarded as an attempt to secure capital in order to enhance population fitness.  Capital can be defined as the entitlement relations that exist in a society.  Entitlement relations refers to the capacity to command resources in an economy with a certain choice environment (Sen, 1981).  In an “uncertain choice environment” capital accumulation takes the form of force exerted to gain entitlements.

The literature in bargaining theory assumes that agents in an economy can easily determine each other’s reasoning which enables them to coordinate their actions in determining an equilibrium solution to a resource allocation problem.  According to Bacharach this transparency in reasoning implicitly assumes a common cultural identity among agents. Resource allocation problems when the information available is incomplete or imperfect can be solved easily as each agent has the ability to infer how other agents view their options.  This is because there are some prominent ways of coordination called focal points which are known to everyone. In societies where complex emergencies occur, there are no prominent ways of coordination of behaviour that agents can use to allocate resources. This is due to the differences in cultural identities among agents.  Agents know the focal points for coordination accepted within their group but do not have any knowledge about the focal points for coordination outside their group.  During a natural disaster in a society with limited natural resources, this difference in the focal points and the instantaneous need to ensure group survival leads to a solution to the resource allocation problem taking the form of a Darwinian survival of the fittest dynamic.  This dynamic is inherent in the sequence of events that take place in complex emergencies.